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Sport teams historically have been reluctant to change ticket prices during the 
season. Recently, however, numerous sport organizations have implemented vari-
able ticket pricing in an effort to maximize revenues. In Major League Baseball 
variable pricing results in ticket price increases or decreases depending on factors 
such as quality of the opponent, day of the week, month of the year, and for special 
events such as opening day, Memorial Day, and Independence Day. Using censored 
regression and elasticity analysis, this article demonstrates that variable pricing 
would have yielded approximately $590,000 per year in additional ticket revenue 
for each major league team in 1996, ceteris paribus. Accounting for capacity 
constraints, this amounts to only about a 2.8% increase above what occurs when 
prices are not varied. For the 1996 season, the largest revenue gain would have 
been the Cleveland Indians, who would have generated an extra $1.4 million in 
revenue. The largest percentage revenue gain would have been the San Francisco 
Giants. The Giants would have seen an estimated 6.7% increase in revenue had 
they used optimal variable pricing.
Variable ticket pricing (VTP) has recently been a much-discussed topic in 
the business of sport, especially as it relates to professional baseball, professional 
hockey, and college football (King, 2003; Rovell, 2002a). VTP refers to changing 
the price of a sporting-event ticket based on the expected demand for that event. 
For example, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Colorado Rockies had four different 
price levels for the same seat throughout the season (Cameron, 2002). The different 
price levels were based primarily on the time of the year (summer versus spring 
or fall), day of the week (weekends versus weekdays), holidays (Memorial Day, 
Independence Day, etc.), the quality of the Rockies’ opponent, or their opponents’ 
star players (e.g., Barry Bonds). The same seat in the outfield pavilion section of 
Coors Field, the Rockies’ home stadium, ranged in price in 2004 from a high of 
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$21 for what the Rockies labeled as “marquee” games to a low of $11 for what 
were considered “value” games. MLB teams who used VTP in 2004 are detailed 
in Table 1. Other sport organizations besides MLB franchises use VTP, as well. 
Several National Hockey League (NHL) teams use VTP strategies, as do a number 
of intercollegiate athletics programs (Rooney, 2003; Rovell, 2002a).
Some MLB teams have concluded that their 81 home games are not 81 units 
of the same product, but rather, based on the aforementioned characteristics such 
as the day of the week and quality of the opponent, are 81 unique products. As 
such, the 81 unique products should each be priced according to their own char-
acteristics that make them more or less attractive to the potential consumer. MLB 
attendance studies support this notion. For example, in a study including more 
than 50 independent variables in explaining MLB game attendance, McDonald 
and Rascher (2000) found variables such as day of the week, home and visiting 
teams’ winning percentages, and weather, among many others, to be statistically 
significant predictors of game attendance. Clearly, a variety of factors make some 
games more appealing and others less appealing to consumers. It seems quite logical 
to price tickets to these games at different levels, especially with teams constantly 
searching for revenue sources to compete with their opponents for players (Howard 
& Crompton, 2004; Zimbalist, 2003).
The varying quality of games throughout a season often creates a second-
ary market because demand for the most popular games might exceed available 
supply. Independent ticket agents, or scalpers, broker tickets obtained from various 
sources to fans unable or unwilling to purchase tickets from a team’s ticket office 
or licensed ticket agency (Caple 2001; Reese, 2004). Ticket scalpers respond to 
market demands (often in violation of city ordinances or state laws), but the team 
initially selling the ticket does not realize any increased revenue during a scalper’s 
transaction (“History of Ticket Scalping,” n.d.). For this reason, the Chicago Cubs 
have recently permitted ticket holders to auction their Wrigley Field tickets on a 
Table 1 2004 MLB Variable Ticket Pricing Programs
Team
Number 
of 
Levels Levels (price for typical outfield bleacher seats)
Arizona Diamondbacks 3 premier ($18), weekend ($15), weekday ($13)
Atlanta Braves 2 premium ($21), regular ($18)
Chicago Cubs 3 prime ($35), regular ($26), value ($15)
Chicago White Sox 2 weekend ($26), weekday ($22)
Colorado Rockies 4 marquee ($21), classic ($19), premium ($17), value ($11)
New York Mets 4 gold ($16), silver ($14), bronze ($12), value ($5)
San Francisco Giants 2 Friday–Sunday ($21), Monday–Thursday ($16)
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 3 prime ($20), regular ($17), value ($10)
Toronto Blue Jays 3 premium ($26), regular ($23), value ($15)
Note. Different seating configurations of each stadium make comparing like seats difficult; however, 
this attempt was made to provide the reader with an idea of the range of price levels used by each team 
for similar seats. Source: www.mlb.com.
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Cubs affiliated Web site, with a fee being paid to the Cubs for this service (Rovell, 
2002b; see also www.buycubstickets.com). It is believed that instituting a compre-
hensive VTP policy would diminish the influence of scalpers and permit greater 
revenue to be generated by the team for games in high demand.
Many industries have previously embraced the variable pricing concept as a 
method for increasing revenue and providing more efficient service to consum-
ers (Bruel, 2003; Rovell, 2002a). Airline flights are typically more expensive for 
selected days of the week (Monday, Friday), times of the day (morning, late after-
noon), and days of the year (holidays) when travel demand is higher. The airlines 
also use variable pricing to encourage passengers to book their flights early (typically 
a purchase at least 10–14 days in advance results in a lower fare) or, in some cases, 
at the last minute (“Travel Tips,” 2004). Hotel pricing characteristically reflects 
expected demand, even though the actual physical product does not change, because 
rooms for weekends or holidays are usually priced higher than for weekdays or 
off-season visits. In fact, sometimes variable pricing even relates to major sporting 
events like the Super Bowl. Many hotels substantially raise room rates during Super 
Bowl week (Baade & Matheson, n.d.). Other industries such as transportation use 
variable pricing; some toll roads now charge higher toll rates during peak times 
and lower rates during off-peak times (“Group Commends,” 2001). The arts use 
variable pricing; matinee movie pricing is one example (Riley, 2002).
Sports franchises are moving forward with VTP strategies before sufficient 
research has been done to empirically evaluate its specific merits to the industry. 
This article provides a straightforward assessment of optimal VTP. First, a review 
of the literature reveals difficulties in estimating the nature of demand functions 
in sports. Specifically, optimal pricing is partially determined by price elasticities 
of demand, yet it is difficult to estimate ticket-price elasticities that are consistent 
over time. Next, a theory of complementary demand is explained that will account 
for nonticket products and services and the effect that ticket prices have on the 
demand for these products and services. Then, using individual game data from 
the 1996 MLB season, ticket prices and corresponding quantities are estimated 
that would have maximized ticket revenue. These are compared with actual prices 
and revenue to determine the yield from initiating a VTP policy. The final section 
contains a discussion of the implications of the results. In summary, this article 
shows that there are financial benefits to be gained from implementing VTP, details 
how much can be gained from a general VTP policy, and provides strategies for 
implementing VTP.
Review of Literature
Price Elasticity of Demand in Sports
Although the literature specifically investigating VTP in sport is limited, the litera-
ture on estimating demand functions and the corresponding elasticities for sporting 
events is extensive. It is typical for these studies to estimate the price elasticity 
of demand to see whether sports teams are setting price to maximize revenue (or 
profit if it can be shown that variable costs are relatively negligible). In practice, 
one could adjust season ticket prices and institute a VTP policy that increases 
revenue based on the results of elasticity studies. One problem is that the results 
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are not consistent across studies. One explanation for this is that it is reasonable 
for prices to be set in the elastic, inelastic, or unit elastic portion of demand under 
various circumstances. For instance, profit maximization results in prices that are 
in the elastic portion of demand if marginal costs are above zero. If marginal costs 
are not above zero, then optimal prices are such that profit maximization equals 
revenue maximization, which occurs at unit elasticity. If other revenue streams are 
accounted for, such as concessions or parking, however, then optimal pricing can 
be in the inelastic portion of demand. Thus, each of these three demand-elasticity 
pricing strategies is justifiable. It is generally assumed in sports ticket pricing that 
the marginal cost of selling an extra seat is so low that the elastic part of demand is 
not optimal in terms of pricing. Any price from unit elasticity down into the inelastic 
portion of demand is a likely finding, as shown in the literature.
Noll’s (1974) point estimates for elasticity for baseball were –0.49 for the 
1970 and 1971 seasons. For the 1984 MLB season, Scully (1989) estimated point 
elasticities of –0.63 and –0.76. Boyd and Boyd (1996) used Scully’s 1984 data 
but added a measure of competition (recreational index for each city) and used 
a recursive feedback loop that incorporated the effects of home-field advantage. 
Namely, not only do more wins increase attendance, but enhanced attendance 
increases the likelihood of winning because a greater home-field advantage is 
created. In this study, point elasticities ranged from –0.58 to –1.20. Hence, Boyd 
and Boyd discovered elasticities that were in the expected range, near or above 
unit elasticity. It is important to note that economists have a habit of referring to 
price elasticities as being positive even though they are actually negative. A price 
elasticity of –1.5 is in the expected range for a profit-maximizing decision maker. 
In fact, any price elasticity that is –1.0 or lower (meaning –1.5 or –2.0) is consistent 
with profit maximization. A price elasticity of –2.0, however, will often be called a 
higher elasticity than –0.8, referring to the absolute value of elasticity and ignoring 
the sign (which is always negative).
Scully’s (1984), Noll’s (1974), and Boyd and Boyd’s (1996) estimates all had 
large enough confidence intervals on the ticket-price coefficient to not exclude unit 
elasticity as a possibility. In other words, none of those studies could reject the 
hypothesis that teams set ticket prices to maximize revenue. A study by Whitney 
(1988) that used more observations than those previously discussed, however, did 
yield an estimate of price elasticity that fell within the inelastic portion of demand. 
Furthermore, Marburger (1997) found price elasticities in the inelastic part of 
demand using annual team-level data covering a 20-year period. The implications 
of inelastic pricing will be explained in the Theoretical Foundations section.
Fort (2004) recently summarized the literature on spectator-sports demand 
analysis and the difficulty in measuring price elasticities. He noted that simply 
analyzing one revenue stream makes it appear that pricing is not profit maximizing 
and that a more complete accounting of all revenue streams (e.g., tickets, conces-
sions, and local television) is consistent with profit-maximization pricing. Given 
this discussion of price elasticities and profit maximization, the current study 
incorporates models that attempt to include the relationship between ticket and 
concession prices.
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Ticket Pricing Issues
It has been difficult for researchers to show profit-maximizing ticket pricing by 
sports teams. There are a number of reasons for this besides the inclusion of other 
revenue streams. First, most pricing data is a simple average of prices that are 
available for various seats for each team each season. Currently, Team Marketing 
Report (TMR) collects pricing data that some researchers have used (e.g., Rishe & 
Mondello, 2004; Rascher, 1999). Although it is likely an improvement over previ-
ously collected pricing data, it has lacked consistency across teams and over time. 
Numerous discussions by the authors and TMR have revealed that TMR is able to 
separate out the luxury-suite ticket prices. TMR has also separated out club-seating 
prices for some, but not all, teams. Furthermore, this varies across seasons. TMR 
relies on the teams to self-report. Because of the prominence of the TMR Fan Cost 
Index, some teams potentially manipulate their reported prices to appear relatively 
inexpensive. Moreover, the number of seats available at each price level does not 
typically weight these prices. In addition, the number of seats sold is generally 
known in aggregate, not separated by seat price. Second, Demmert (1973) noted 
that there is a correlation between population and ticket price across many seasons 
(likely based on the connection to income in which more highly populated areas 
are associated with higher incomes, increasing demand and, therefore, prices). This 
multicollinearity can cloud the interpretation of coefficients on price. Third, as 
Salant (1992) pointed out, the long-term price of tickets might be optimal (adjust-
ing for risk), but in the short term a team might be over- or underpricing in order to 
maintain consistency. This is a form of insurance in which the team bears the risk. 
Fourth, similar to Fort’s (2004) findings, ticket prices might be kept relatively low 
in order to increase the number of attendees at an event who are likely to spend 
more money on parking, concessions, and merchandise and who will drive up 
sponsorship revenue for the team, thus maximizing overall revenues, rather than 
simply ticket revenues.
DeSerpa (1994) discussed the rationality of apparently low season-ticket 
prices. Even though many games sell out in the National Basketball Association 
and National Football League (focal sports in his study), it is rational for the seller 
to price below the myopic short-term demand price in order to give a fan a reason to 
purchase season tickets. In fact, DeSerpa discussed the possibility, but unlikeliness, 
of charging different prices for each event based on its demand. He surmised that it 
was administratively expensive and subject to potential negative fan reaction.
DeSerpa (1994) also noted that it is optimal to underprice season tickets if 
fans will likely want to attend only some of the games and resell the tickets for 
the remaining contests. The season ticket must be priced low enough for holders 
to be able to at least recoup their initial investment after assuming the transaction 
costs of resale (e.g., time, effort, search costs, and actual costs such as postage 
and advertising). Lower priced season tickets also potentially created a home-
field advantage for teams. Each argument or concern DeSerpa proffered can be 
addressed in a VTP system.
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Marburger (1997) developed a model showing that pricing on the inelastic 
portion of demand can be explained by accounting for nonticket purchases such as 
concessions. Marburger noted that baseball teams set prices on the inelastic portion 
of demand, but he did not investigate whether pricing was based on concessions 
decisions, just that it occurs. Under multiple methods of measuring ticket price, 
Coates and Harrison (2005) found that ticket demand is also quite price inelastic.
Variable Pricing Literature
Specific to variable pricing, Heilman and Wendling (1976) analyzed ticket-price 
discounting by the Milwaukee Bucks of the National Basketball Association. The 
Bucks discounted prices from $5 to $2 and from $3.50 to $2 for 15 games of the 
1974–75 season. The fifteen 1973–74 games that corresponded to the 1974–75 
discounted games averaged 9,307 fans and had only three sellouts. The discounted 
1974–75 games averaged 10,396 fans and had nine sellouts. Certainly, several 
factors (winter weather, player injuries, or even reversion to the mean) beyond the 
discounted price could have contributed to the attendance increases. Other teams did 
not duplicate the Bucks’ attempt to discount tickets, however. Although the increase 
in attendance might appear minimal and result from other factors besides discount-
ing, when ancillary revenue sources (parking, concessions, and merchandise sales) 
are added to the cost of a ticket, further investigation into VTP was warranted. The 
Bucks, however, remained one of the few teams in American professional sport to 
implement a form of VTP until 1999 (King, 2002a; Rovell, 2002b).
Although some research has been conducted regarding VTP, this limited body 
of knowledge is not yet sufficient to provide evidence concerning the merits of 
using VTP to set single-game ticket prices for sporting events. Despite this lack 
of information, some teams have implemented variable pricing, but others have 
remained skeptical (King, 2002a). This study investigates the financial gains of VTP 
and provides some direction regarding how it should be implemented in MLB.
Theoretical Foundations
The demand for baseball games changes from game to game, partly because of 
the varying quality and perception of quality of the home and visiting teams and 
partly because of nonperformance factors such as day of the week or month. For a 
given price, Table 2 (columns 2 and 3) shows that attendance varies greatly across 
games. The average deviation from the mean is nearly 23%. For 11 of the Atlanta 
Braves’ 81 home games, the deviation from the mean is over 30%, and the Braves 
are not even in the top half of teams with high attendance variation.
In general, many organizations are trying to minimize the effect of team perfor-
mance, which is one of the key factors in the changing demand from game to game 
(Brockinton, 2003; George, 2003). As shown in the literature, team performance 
is one of the most significant demand factors that can be affected by an owner. For 
example, Bruggink and Eaton (1996) and Rascher (1999) analyzed game-by-game 
attendance and the importance of team performance. Using annual data, Alexan-
der (2001) showed that the variable with the highest statistical significance is the 
number of games behind the leader, a measure of team performance. Teams are 
building new stadiums, improving concessions and restaurants, and creating areas 
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where kids and adults can enjoy themselves but not necessarily watch the game 
(George, 2003). These improvements not only increase demand but also lessen the 
importance that team performance uncertainty has on expected revenues.
At the same time, teams are beginning to use variable pricing in an attempt to 
manage shifting demand from game to game, given that they are unable to com-
pletely remove the variation. The theory on which this analysis is based is simply 
short-term revenue maximization with two goods that are complementary. Tickets 
and concessions are complementary goods. The demand for tickets is higher if 
concessions prices are lower because the overall cost of enjoying the game would 
be lower (Marburger, 1997; Fort, 2004). Similarly, the demand for concessions is 
higher if ticket prices are lower. The model consists of demand for tickets and a 
separate aggregate demand for nonticket products and services (hereafter referred 
to as concessions) that is affected by ticket price. This is where the complementarity 
between the two demand functions occurs. The following three models describe 
increasing degrees of complexity for the relationship between ticket demand and 
concessions demand. As shown, VTP policies should account for the extent to 
which there is complementarity between ticket demand and nonticket demand. 
For Model 1, let 
	 Q1 = α1 – β1P1 (1.1)
be the demand for tickets, where Q1 is quantity demanded, P1 is ticket price, and 
α1 and β1 are scalars describing the shape of the demand curve. In this model, 
the demand for concessions, Q2, will be unaffected by ticket prices. The optimal 
revenue maximizing ticket price is
 
P1
1
12
* = α
β
. (1.2)
The price elasticity of demand ( ηPQ ) at P1*  and Q1* , where Q1 12 1* = α , is equal 
to –1, a common result from microeconomic theory. Thus, in the model, price is 
chosen where ηPQ = −1. This model is applicable for teams that do not share in 
concessions revenues or simply receive a fixed annual payment for concessions 
rights from a vendor, perhaps having sold them up front to build a new stadium. In 
general, much of the costs associated with operating a baseball team are fixed costs. 
The marginal costs of selling an extra ticket are low; hence, revenue maximization 
will be assumed in place of profit maximization. Relaxing this assumption adds a 
marginal cost term to the analysis, but does not change the fundamental findings. 
The marginal costs of MLB teams are unknown, and, therefore, the empirical 
analysis does not incorporate it.
Model 2 is applicable for teams that receive all or a share of concessions 
revenue. Let 
	 Q1 = α1 – β1P1  (2.1)
be ticket demand, as in Model 1. Furthermore, let Q2 = Q1, meaning that each 
person who purchases a ticket also buys some concessions. Moreover, the price of 
concessions is exogenously determined by the concessionaire and will be noted 
by P2 . Note that concessions do have a nonnegligible marginal cost that affects 
total profitability. A more complete model would include marginal cost in the final 
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optimal ticket-price-setting equation. This would add unnecessary complexity, 
however, and, more important, would make it more cumbersome to compare how 
price is affected with Model 1. The resulting optimal revenue maximizing ticket 
price is
 
P
P
1
1
1
2
2 2
* = −α
β . (2.2)
As seen in Equation 2.2, the revenue-maximizing, or optimal, ticket price 
is lower when accounting for the price of concessions (and any other nonticket 
products or services such as merchandise and parking) than it would be if it were 
set in a vacuum in which only ticket revenue is accounted for, as in Equation 1.2. 
This is consistent with findings in the review of literature mentioned previously. 
Specifically, η α α βPQ
P
P=
−
+




<( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2
1, meaning that the elasticity for Model 
2 is smaller in absolute value terms than for Model 1. The optimal ticket price is set 
in the inelastic portion of demand. It is predictable that for low concessions prices 
the impact of concessions revenue on ticket-price decision making is minimized. In 
fact, P PQ2 0 1→ → −,η , which is the optimal price elasticity when not accounting 
for concessions revenues (Model 1).
Model 3 generalizes Models 1 and 2 by adding cross-price effects to ticket 
demand and concessions demand, exhibiting the notion that the total price of attend-
ing a game is what matters to customers, not just ticket price. Therefore, let
 
Q P P1 1 1 1 1 2= − −α β γ  (3.1)
be ticket demand, where γ1 is the incremental effect of concessions prices on ticket 
demand. The demand for concessions will be shown by
 
Q P P2 2 2 2 2 1= − −α β γ . (3.2)
As noted in the equation, ticket price, P1, affects the demand for concessions 
in a negative way. If ticket prices are raised, the demand for concessions declines 
based on γ2, the marginal propensity to purchase concessions based on ticket price 
changes. The optimal revenue-maximizing ticket price is
 
P
P
1
1
1
1 2 2
12 2
* ( )= − +α
β
γ γ
β
, (3.3)
with P2 exogenous. Even though the concessionaire often sets concessions prices, 
removing this assumption does not change the direction of the impact, only the 
magnitude. Equation 3.3 shows that the ticket prices ought to be lower if fans care 
about concessions prices. Specifically, higher γ1 or γ2 leads to lower optimal ticket 
prices. The more sensitive customers are to the price of complementary goods and 
services, the lower ticket prices should be in order to maximize profits. Thus, it is 
important to account for cross-price effects when setting prices. Overall, the price 
elasticity for Model 3 might be higher or lower than for Model 2, depending on 
the relative magnitudes of β1, γ1, and γ2. Like Model 2, however, the absolute value 
of the price elasticity for Model 3 is lower than for Model 1. In the analysis that 
follows, variable pricing outcomes will be determined under two scenarios—one 
without the cross effects (Model 1) and one with the cross effects (Model 3). Again, 
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Model 1 pertains to teams that either do not receive any concessions revenue or 
receive a fixed payment in exchange for concessions rights. Model 3 applies to 
teams that receive a share of concessions revenues.
To be clear, these models do not assume profit maximization, win maximiza-
tion, or something else; they only assume that a team’s objectives are consistent 
throughout the season. For example, if a team is focused primarily on profits, it will 
set ticket and concessions prices in order to maximize the sum of both revenues. In 
a similar way, if a team is attempting to maximize wins, it will still want to price as 
a profit maximizer because its relevant costs are not variable. Such a team would 
likely spend more on players in order to improve winning than a profit-maximizing 
team would. The team would still want to set prices in order to maximize revenues 
from tickets and concessions, however, just as a profit-maximizing team would. 
An exception to this argument is if a win-maximizing owner chose to price below 
profit-maximizing levels in order to raise attendance (even though it is lowering 
revenues) to increase the impact of home-field advantage, which would increase the 
likelihood of winning more games and, therefore, satisfy his or her objectives.
The models also do not need to assume linear demand functions. Linear demand 
is chosen for simplicity. As described in the next section, nonlinear demand changes 
the magnitudes of the findings. Using linear demand generates more conserva-
tive findings—the gains from variable pricing are lower. The empirical analysis 
operationalizes this by noting that regardless of an owner’s objectives (winning, 
profits, or a combination of the two), it is assumed that prices are set to maximize 
those objectives. For a particular game it might be that prices are too low or too 
high given demand, but because one price is charged for the entire season, it is 
objective maximizing on average.
One hypothesis stemming from these models is that adoption of VTP would 
improve revenues for MLB teams. Another hypothesis is that for those teams who 
are adjusting prices, the amount of adjustment is correct. For instance, the Cardi-
nals had only raised their prices for VTP games by $2 for 2002. In contrast, the 
Rockies have had prices for particular seats that varied by as much as $6 (Rovell, 
2002b). This analysis will provide a benchmark for how much teams should be 
adjusting their prices.
It is important to note that there are public relations issues that play a role in 
VTP. For example, the Nashville Predators have been thinking about incorporat-
ing VTP but fear a negative fan backlash at a time when they are trying to build 
a loyal fan base (Cameron, 2002). A team might therefore opt to raise its prices 
only nominally to see if there is a backlash in which fans react with an emotional 
response that actually shifts demand (not slides along demand, as price changes 
are expected to do). This analysis ignores any public relations issues.
Method
The first analysis tested Model 1 in which only ticket pricing is accounted for. The 
methodology involved analyzing how demand for each game deviated from the 
average demand for each team. For example, as shown in Figure 1, Point A is on the 
average demand curve for the Atlanta Braves. It represents the actual average ticket 
price ($13.06) and average attendance (35,793). The slope of the demand curve is 
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based on the assumption that the price elasticity equals –1.0 (This assumption can 
be relaxed without loss of generality. For instance, it can be assumed that the team 
prices on the inelastic portion of demand are at, say, –0.75.) Therefore, slope can 
be determined from price, quantity, and elasticity.
Point B is the actual price (still $13.06) and attendance (48,961) for the Braves’ 
home opener. This is the demand for that game, given the price. Looking at actual 
attendance reveals the demand. As described in Theoretical Foundations, ticket 
prices, on average, were optimal for the Braves. It was assumed that each team was 
doing its best at determining ticket prices and was setting them to account for the 
average expected demand for the entire season. Therefore, the price elasticity was 
set at –1.0 at Point A. At Point B the elasticity changed to –0.73, thus it is a subop-
timal price. Raising price to $15.46 (Point C) changed the elasticity back to –1.0 
and lowered attendance to 42,371. Revenue was then calculated for this new price 
and quantity and compared with the actual revenue from that game (measured by 
multiplying the actual average price charged for that game with the actual quantity 
of spectators for that game). These measurements were taken for each game of the 
season for each team in order to be able to see how adjusted ticket prices affect 
revenue. See the Appendix for a brief description of the calculations.
The previous example used linear demand. If a slightly curved demand func-
tion is used, the gains from variable pricing would be higher because the loss in 
number of attendees is compensated by higher pricing as a result of the curvature 
of the demand function. As shown in Figure 2, the simplified demand function, 
Curved	 Increase, had an optimal price point at D, whereas the linear demand 
function’s optimal price point was C. Table 3 provides the details of each of these 
demand functions. Each demand function was shifted the same amount (as shown 
by Point B). Figure 3 shows the associated revenue at each point. The curved 
demand resulted in higher revenue ($18.52) from variable pricing (Point D) than 
for the linear demand ($16.00 at Point C). Thus, an equal increase in the number of 
attendees will lead to lower gains using linear demand instead of curved demand. 
This is also true for a low-demand game. Point G is the optimal price for the linear-
demand function and Point F maximizes revenue for the curved demand. As shown 
in Table 3, the curved-demand function resulted in higher revenues from VTP. This 
was not surprising—for a given price, a curved-demand function will result in more 
attendees (higher quantity) than a linear-demand function. A constant elasticity 
of demand function (CED) has more curvature than the ones shown in Figure 2. 
Revenue is constant regardless of price for CED. Prices can be set at any level 
and yield the same revenue. CED is an unrealistic demand function for baseball. 
An even more extreme demand function, a super-curved demand in which the 
degree of curvature is greater than that for CED, is such that the revenue function 
looks U shaped, not hill shaped, as in Figure 3. In that case, revenue-maximizing 
prices are either very low or very high and unlikely to be consistent with reality 
in baseball. An example of this type of demand function is	P = 1/ln(Q). The use 
of linear demand in the subsequent analysis is conservative in that the gains from 
variable pricing are a lower bound of what would be the case if demand functions 
for baseball are curved. This reason, along with simplicity and a lack of research 
about the shape of baseball demand functions, was justification for using linear 
demand in the following analysis. Parallel shifts of the demand function were 
    419
Figure 2 — Curved demand functions versus linear demand functions.
Figure 1 — Optimal variable pricing adjustment for Atlanta.
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also assumed because of simplicity and a lack of relevant research showing other 
types of shifts. Unfortunately, attendance by seat location and specific price is not 
publicly available. If it were, one could examine how much demand changes per 
price point to get a sense of the nature of the shift in demand.
The subsequent analysis accounted for the possibility that stadium capacity 
prevented the true demand from being revealed. In other words, sellouts typically 
imply that there was excess demand beyond the capacity of the stadium. The 
standard result would be to raise prices until the entire stadium is full and there 
are no persons outside who are interested in attending the game at the new higher 
ticket price. In order to determine how much to raise prices, the amount of excess 
demand needed to be estimated. This was done using a censored regression, which 
can forecast the true demand as though there were not a capacity constraint. It used 
information from uncensored observations (those without a capacity constraint as 
shown by not having sold out) to estimate what would have happened without the 
constraint.
The censored regression used attendance as the dependent variable and vari-
ous demand factors listed in the second data set as the independent variables. The 
result was an empirical model that can be used to forecast what attendance would 
have been for the capacity-constrained games. The methodology was the same as 
the first analysis, but used the new forecasted attendance when estimating optimal 
prices and resulting revenue.
The final analysis included the focus of Model 3—how the prices of comple-
mentary goods (tickets and concessions) affect the demand and, hence, optimal price 
for each other. This analysis created a single demand for the joint product of tickets 
Figure 3 — Revenue functions of curved demand versus linear demand.
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and concessions, with concessions prices exogenously determined. According to 
Financial	World, these nonticket revenues made up 35% of ticket plus nonticket 
revenues for MLB teams during 1996 (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997). For every 
dollar spent at a stadium by a patron, 35 cents were spent on concessions, mer-
chandise, and parking. Therefore, the nonticket price for each team was set at 54% 
(54% = 35%/[1–35%]) of the ticket price because team-specific data on nonticket 
revenue was unavailable. Given this new joint-demand function, optimal prices 
were set for each game as in the two previous analyses. The censored regression 
forecasts of attendance were used in this analysis. This analysis accounted for the 
combined product of tickets and concessions, so, as a group, the demand elasticity 
was –1.0. Given that the concessions price was fixed and positive, the new optimal 
ticket price would be on the inelastic portion of demand. This was consistent with 
the findings in the literature.
These three analyses determined the optimal variable ticket price for nearly 
every game for the 1996 MLB season. The 1996 season was used because during 
that year no MLB team used VTP. It should be noted that 1996 was the first full 
season after the strike of 1994–95. It is possible that the findings here are not typi-
cal of a MLB season. An important factor in this analysis, however, is the shift 
in demand from game to game. Attendance for the 1996 season has a standard 
deviation that is only 5% greater than attendance for 2003. The use of more recent 
data, which would include teams using VTP, raised validity concerns with the 
attempt to predict additional revenue generated through the use of VTP. The use 
of the 1996 data allows the analysis to be consistent across all teams. The analysis 
showed what the ticket price should have been with the corresponding results if 
every team had participated in optimal VTP. In order to achieve this, data for 2,193 
of the 2,268 scheduled regular season games were used. The few games not used 
in the analysis either lacked sufficient data, were double-headers, or were rainouts 
that were never made up.
The data were broken into two sets. One set was used to forecast optimal 
VTP. It included actual attendance, average ticket price, stadium capacity, and 
average concessions expenditures. Attendance data came from www.sportsline.
com, ticket price data from Team	Marketing	Report, stadium capacity data from 
www.ballparks.com, and concessions information from Financial	World’s financial 
report on baseball for the 1996 season (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997). Table 2 
(columns 1 and 4) shows average attendance and average ticket price for each team 
for the 1996 season.
The second set of data was used to make an adjustment to demand for games 
that are censored by capacity constraints, namely games that are sold out or nearly 
sold out. This adjusted demand was then used in the VTP analysis. This data set 
contained actual attendance, the number of wins by the home team and visiting 
team in the previous season, the population of the local Consolidated Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (CMSA; term used by the U.S. Census Bureau), indicator variables 
for opening day, a new stadium, a weekend game, and a game in April. The data 
set came from www.sportsline.com, except population, which was obtained from 
the U.S. Census Bureau. Table 4 contains summary statistics of the data.
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Results
Based on the estimates from the test of Model 1, if the Atlanta Braves, for example, 
had raised ticket prices for the opening game, actual attendance would have been 
42,371, with actual ticket revenues increasing by $15,817, or 2.5% for that game. 
An elasticity of –1.0 implies revenue maximization. The analysis, however, could 
have begun with any elasticity as long as the resulting elasticity at Point C is the 
same as that at Point A (see Figure 1). Therefore, this does not require revenue 
maximization or profit maximization, only consistency in terms of the objectives 
of the franchise throughout the season.
Continuing with the Braves example, Table 5 shows the results for every odd 
home game. The findings show that there are fewer games that have excess demand 
(although they have a higher average excess demand) than there are games that 
have lower demand than average (Figure 4). In fact, in 30 out of the 81 Braves’ 
home games, demand exceeded the average, and the average optimal price increase 
is estimated to be 11.0%, whereas the average decreased price is estimated to be 
–6.5%. Also, as expected, the high-demand games generally are for an entire series. 
Thus, one VTP strategy for the Braves would be to use variable pricing for series 
that are in high demand and simply lower prices on the other games in general (as 
a public relations move and to increase overall revenues).
The bottom row of Table 5 shows the average results for the entire Braves 
season. The average per-game revenue increase for the season is $4,367, or 0.9%. 
The results for each team are shown in Table 2. Columns 8 and 12 show the result 
from Table 5 for the Braves. Over the course of the full season, the Braves could 
have increased their ticket revenues by $353,706, or 0.9%.
Variable pricing would have yielded an average of approximately $504,000 per 
year in additional revenue for each MLB team, ceteris paribus, or over $14 million 
for the league as a whole. This amounts to only about a 2.6% increase above what 
occurs when prices are not varied, as shown in Table 2. The amount of variation 
Table 4 Summary Statistics of the Censored Regression Data
 M  SD  Minimum Maximum
Game attendance 26,868 11,852 6,021 57,467
Home team’s previous season wins 81.92 10.02 56 100
Visiting team’s previous season wins 81.99 10.11 56 100
Opening day 0.008 0.090 0 1
Weekend game 0.477 0.499 0 1
New stadium 0.215 0.411 0 1
Population of CMSA 5,997,132 4,774,503 1,640,831 18,107,235
Games played during April 0.162 0.368 0 1
Note. CMSA = Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area, a measure of local population from the 
U.S. Census Bureau.
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in ticket prices is just over 11% on average. The fact that such a large price swing 
only yields a revenue swing four times smaller is simply based on the large change 
in attendance that occurs when prices are varied. This occurs with all downward 
sloping demand curves and is not unique to baseball. For the 1996 season, the 
largest revenue gain would have been for the New York Yankees, which would 
have generated an extra $1.24 million in ticket revenue, or a 3.7% increase. The 
largest percentage revenue gain would have been for the San Francisco Giants. The 
Giants would have seen an estimated 6.7% increase in revenue, or $1.01 million, 
if they had used optimal VTP. The smallest amount of impact would have been for 
the Colorado Rockies, which averaged only plus or minus 80 patrons in absolute 
deviation from the mean attendance per game throughout the 1996 season. In fact, 
teams with the lowest average attendance benefit the most from variable pricing. 
This is not surprising because those teams tend to have the highest variation in 
attendance, allowing them to gain from dynamic pricing.
The Rockies would gain the least from VTP because they had many sellouts 
in 1996. As described in the Method section, a censored regression is carried out 
in order to forecast the true demand above the capacity constraint. Although there 
are many more factors that affect game-by-game attendance than those used here, 
this analysis used only those factors known before ticket-price setting occurred. 
Thus, only factors known before the beginning of the season are used in order to 
be consistent with what would be known by team management when setting prices. 
The Wald chi-squared test of significance showed that the model was significant at 
the .001% level, with a Wald statistic of 906.6. A potential problem is that the errors 
for a series between two teams might not be independent. It is expected that across 
different groups of games (a three-game series, for example) there is independence 
of the errors but not necessarily in each group. This type of clustered correlation 
leads to understating the standard errors. A robust estimator of the variance is used 
to correct the standard errors. There is no evidence of multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. As expected, there is evidence of omitted variables missing 
from the regression. As explained, performance-specific factors that are only known 
to price setters once the season has begun, such as the home pitcher’s earned-run 
average at that point in the season, were omitted. The variance-inflation factor (VIF) 
averaged 1.19 across the group of variables tested for multicollinearity, with the 
largest VIF at 1.58. The Ramsey RESET test shows evidence of omitted variables 
with an F-statistic of 29.67.
Table 6 shows the results of the censored regression. The signs of the coef-
ficients are as expected. Out of 2,193 games, only 109 were sold out. A sellout 
is defined, for these purposes, as any game in which actual attendance is 99.0% 
or higher of stadium capacity. The estimate of attendance for these 109 games is 
based on the predicted values from the censored regression.
As shown in Table 7, 10 teams had adjustments to their attendance based on 
the censored regression. The results are similar to that of Table 2, except column 
13 shows the gain for those 10 teams in Table 7 if they account for the capacity 
constraint when adjusting their prices for their VTP strategy. Overall, adjusting for 
demand beyond stadium capacity raises the increased revenue from VTP policies 
from $14.1 million to $16.5 million for the league as a whole.
The final analysis addressed Model 3 from the Theoretical Foundations sec-
tion by accounting for nonticket revenues such as concessions, merchandise, and 
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parking. Table 8 shows the results of allowing the team to vary ticket prices while 
accounting for nonticket prices in order to maximize its objectives. Columns 9, 10, 
and 11 in Table 8 illustrate that the average team would have gained $911,000 in 
ticket and nonticket revenue by adopting a VTP policy while accounting for non-
ticket prices. The league overall would have gained $25.5 million. The Cleveland 
Indians would have earned the most, over $2.2 million, from such a policy.
Discussion
This analysis has shown that MLB could have increased ticket revenues by approxi-
mately 2.8%, or $16.5 million, and total stadium revenues by about $25.5 million 
for the 1996 season if teams used VTP. Total revenues in MLB are estimated to 
have grown from $1.78 billion in 1996 to approximately $4.3 billion in 2003, or 
250%. Similar changes in the effect of VTP strategies, as discovered in this study, 
would yield nearly $40 million in ticket revenue and over $60 million in ticket plus 
nonticket revenue for MLB. Therefore, it behooves team owners and the league 
office to consider and implement VTP strategies, especially because teams and the 
league are constantly searching for ways to increase revenues.
The San Francisco Giants would have seen an estimated 6.7% increase in ticket 
revenue, or $1.01 million, if they had used optimal VTP in 1996. It is interesting 
that the Giants had considered using VTP since the 1996 season because they had 
noticed a huge variation in attendance patterns at Candlestick Park, the team’s 
then-home facility (King, 2002a). In addition to weather issues (pleasant for day 
games but frigid for night) in their facility, the Giants of the mid-1990s occasion-
ally fielded teams of lower quality. The results of this study would strongly sug-
gest that teams in similar facility or on-the-field talent situations maximize their 
revenues through VTP. 
The results of this study support the use of VTP both to increase and decrease 
prices from average seasonal levels. The data showed fewer games with excess 
demand than those with diminished demand. The selected games with excess 
demand deviated, however, from the mean at a greater rate than those with decreased 
demand. Currently, most MLB teams have focused their VTP strategies on the 
revenue potential of increased prices from highly demanded games (King, 2002a). 
It appears that some teams, however, have begun to realize the potential benefit of 
attracting fans to less desirable contests by lowering prices (King, 2002b). The New 
York Yankees sold $5 tickets in certain sections of Yankee Stadium on Mondays, 
Tuesdays, and Thursdays in 2003 (King, 2003).
Lowering ticket prices for less desirable games would potentially create more 
positive relationships between teams and local municipalities. MLB teams have 
often been chastised for seeking subsidies for new revenue generating facilities 
that are financially inaccessible to many taxpayers (Pappas, 2002; O’Keefe, 2004). 
Given the number of games in a typical season for which demand is below the yearly 
average (Figure 4), lowering prices creates an opportunity for teams to potentially 
attract new or disenfranchised fans and presents local governments with a more 
favorable reaction to their public-policy decisions supporting the local franchise. 
Marketing less desirable games with lower ticket prices as “value” games, as the 
Chicago Cubs, Colorado Rockies, New York Mets, Tampa Bay Devil Rays, and 
Toronto Blue Jays did in 2004, allows teams to reach market segments perhaps 
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Table 8 Summary of Effects of Variable Ticket Pricing (With 
Capacity Adjustment and Nonticket-Revenue Adjustment), Part 1
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Atlanta 35,793 5,878 16.4 $13.07 7.18 467,458 475,184 732,451
Baltimore 45,475 2,098 4.6 $13.16 7.23 597,539 601,064 930,316
Boston 28,687 3,952 13.8 $15.46 8.49 442,643 449,290 693,186
California 22,476 4,899 21.8 $8.44 4.64 189,697 195,652 299,985
Chicago (AL) 21,115 4,530 21.5 $14.11 7.76 297,927 307,000 470,860
Chicago (NL) 28,606 7,044 24.6 $13.16 7.22 375,309 391,059 598,164
Cincinnati 24,097 4,549 18.9 $7.96 4.37 191,568 197,327 302,814
Cleveland 41,983 1,716 4.1 $14.73 7.99 609,592 632,454 972,537
Colorado 48,037 144 0.3 $10.62 5.84 509,675 510,557 791,065
Detroit 14,464 5,018 34.7 $10.60 5.83 153,322 167,596 251,923
Florida 21,839 4,541 20.8 $10.37 5.70 226,469 233,085 357,643
Houston 24,394 7,362 30.2 $10.65 5.86 259,793 273,185 416,071
Kansas City 17,949 4,013 22.4 $9.74 5.36 174,828 180,535 276,690
Los Angeles 39,364 7,038 17.9 $9.94 5.47 391,274 398,086 613,286
Milwaukee 16,847 5,594 33.2 $9.37 5.15 157,853 169,531 256,350
Minnesota 17,930 4,899 27.3 $10.16 5.59 182,170 192,609 292,802
Montreal 19,982 7,155 35.8 $9.07 4.99 181,240 195,308 295,006
New York (AL) 28,371 8,999 31.7 $14.58 8.02 413,655 437,386 664,896
New York (NL) 20,260 4,610 22.8 $11.83 6.51 239,676 249,220 381,042
Oakland 14,339 5,183 36.1 $11.34 6.24 162,607 177,076 266,509
Philadelphia 23,077 4,679 20.3 $11.01 6.06 254,072 261,022 400,762
Pittsburgh 17,039 5,914 34.7 $10.09 5.55 171,919 183,977 278,532
San Diego 27,258 10,532 38.6 $9.89 5.43 269,311 293,227 441,505
San Francisco 17,548 6,898 39.3 $10.61 5.84 186,182 205,580 307,980
Seattle 33,593 9,398 28.0 $11.59 6.37 389,349 407,036 621,177
St. Louis 32,912 6,110 18.6 $9.92 5.45 326,153 334,308 513,889
Texas 36,111 6,664 18.5 $11.96 6.58 431,888 439,931 677,470
Toronto 31,600 2,718 8.6 $13.93 7.66 440,190 442,756 684,860
Average 26,827 5,433 23.0 $11.33 6.23 310,477 321,466 492,492
Note. 1 = average attendance; 2 = average absolute change; 3 = average deviation from mean (%); 4 
= average ticket price ($); 5 = nonticket price ($); 6 = average actual ticket revenue ($); 7 = average 
variable-pricing ticket ($); 8 = average variable-pricing ticket and nonticket revenue ($).
otherwise unreachable because of pricing/income issues, in addition to the afore-
mentioned public-relations benefits.
Currently, teams might not want to implement multiple price points for each 
game, as shown in Figure 4. As discussed by Levy, Dutta, Bergen, and Venable 
(1997), menu costs affect the frequency and desire to change prices to reflect 
changes in demand or supply. Menu	costs are costs associated with physically 
changing prices on products, having to look up prices to tell a customer the price 
for a particular game, or, more generally, any costs associated with having more 
than one price for a product or service. In addition, asymmetric information, search 
costs, and simple confusion for customers regarding the price for different games 
might cause franchises to have fewer prices for a particular seat throughout the 
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Table 8 Summary of Effects of Variable Ticket Pricing (With Capacity 
Adjustment and Nonticket-Revenue Adjustment), Part 2
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Atlanta 58,689,358 59,328,558 639,200 1.1 37,864,102 38,489,896 1.7
Baltimore 75,020,982 75,355,563 334,581 0.4 48,400,634 48,686,180 0.6
Boston 55,573,799 56,148,028 574,229 1.0 35,854,064 36,392,476 1.5
California 23,816,434 24,298,812 482,378 2.0 15,365,441 15,847,819 3.1
Chicago (AL) 37,404,684 38,139,656 734,972 2.0 24,132,054 24,867,027 3.0
Chicago (NL) 47,120,107 48,451,267 1,331,160 2.8 30,400,069 31,675,750 4.2
Cincinnati 24,051,406 24,527,936 476,530 2.0 15,517,036 15,983,459 3.0
Cleveland 76,534,300 78,775,478 2,241,177 2.9 49,376,968 51,228,769 3.8
Colorado 63,989,693 64,076,289 86,597 0.1 41,283,673 41,355,136 0.2
Detroit 19,249,553 20,405,782 1,156,229 6.0 12,419,066 13,575,296 9.3
Florida 28,433,181 28,969,046 535,865 1.9 18,343,988 18,879,853 2.9
Houston 32,616,970 33,701,747 1,084,777 3.3 21,043,206 22,127,983 5.2
Kansas City 21,949,610 22,411,903 462,293 2.1 14,161,039 14,623,331 3.3
Los Angeles 49,124,509 49,676,206 551,697 1.1 31,693,231 32,244,929 1.7
Milwaukee 19,818,383 20,764,351 945,968 4.8 12,786,054 13,732,021 7.4
Minnesota 22,871,407 23,716,997 845,590 3.7 14,755,746 15,601,336 5.7
Montreal 22,754,708 23,895,483 1,140,776 5.0 14,680,457 15,819,930 7.8
New York (AL) 51,934,362 53,856,573 1,922,211 3.7 33,506,040 35,428,250 5.7
New York (NL) 30,091,356 30,864,393 773,037 2.6 19,413,778 20,186,815 4.0
Oakland 20,415,308 21,587,258 1,171,950 5.7 13,171,166 14,343,116 8.9
Philadelphia 31,898,801 32,461,705 562,903 1.8 20,579,872 21,142,775 2.7
Pittsburgh 21,584,447 22,561,111 976,664 4.5 13,925,450 14,902,112 7.0
San Diego 33,812,057 35,761,936 1,949,879 5.8 21,814,230 23,751,402 8.9
San Francisco 23,375,197 24,946,394 1,571,197 6.7 15,080,772 16,651,969 10.4
Seattle 48,882,717 50,315,365 1,432,648 2.9 31,537,236 32,969,885 4.5
St. Louis 40,948,543 41,625,024 676,481 1.7 26,418,415 27,078,914 2.5
Texas 54,223,540 54,875,042 651,502 1.2 34,982,929 35,634,431 1.9
Toronto 55,265,885 55,473,682 207,797 0.4 35,655,410 35,863,207 0.6
Average 38,980,403 39,891,842 911,439 2.8 25,148,647 26,038,717 4.3
Note. 9 = total actual ticket and nonticket revenue ($); 10 = total variable-pricing ticket and nonticket revenue 
($); 11 = total change in ticket and nonticket revenue ($); 12 = change in total revenue (%); 13 = total actual 
ticket revenue ($); 14 = total variable-pricing ticket revenue ($); 15 = change in total ticket revenue (%).
season than variable pricing predicts. For this reason, many teams have only used 
a minimal number of ticket-pricing tiers, usually two to four, in their VTP system 
(Rovell, 2002b).
Confusion and the additional costs associated with changing ticket prices 
might already be in the process of being eliminated. Kevin Fenton, Colorado 
Rockies senior director of ticket operations, noted that once the initial confusion 
regarding multiple price points for games is overcome, patrons realize that tickets 
can be priced like other industries (Rovell, 2002b). In the near future, the nega-
tive fan reaction to changing ticket price will likely be alleviated if not eliminated 
(Adams, 2003). Ticket offices are also now better equipped to handle menu costs 
434  Rascher et al.
issues. Although ticket offices were not prepared to handle extensive VTP in the 
1990s, recent technological advances have allowed most American professional 
sport teams to implement new ticket policies such as bar-coded and print-at-home 
tickets to prepare for extensive VTP in the future (Zoltak, 2002).
An initial VTP recommendation is that for every 10% increase in attendance 
(or specifically, expected attendance) above the average, teams should raise ticket 
prices by 5% and receive a gain of 1.2% in ticket revenue. The practical use of 
variable pricing, however, would entail creating, at most, five different prices for 
each seat in a stadium throughout the season, not a different price for each game. 
High-demand games or series should be priced accordingly, but teams should not 
forget the potential benefits of lowering prices for less desired games. The present 
findings reinforce previous research identifying factors such as day of the week or 
a rivalry game as affecting demand for MLB tickets.
Using the Atlanta Braves again as an example, the average attendance was 
35,793. Based on the variable-pricing ticket prices from Table 5, the recommended 
pricing schedule for 1996 would have been $12.00, $13.06, and $15.50. A descrip-
tive analysis of Braves attendance revealed three tiers of games that corresponded 
with the three price points: games with attendance below 28,831 (greater than –1 
standard deviation from the mean), games with an attendance of 28,832 to 42,755 
(between 1 and –1 standard deviation from the mean), and games with an attendance 
over 42,756 (greater than 1 standard deviation from the mean). A factor analysis 
of games falling within each tier was then performed to finalize the recommended 
pricing schedule.
For the Braves, a Tier 1 game (average price of $12.00) would have included 
games from the second game of the season to May 14, played Sunday through 
Thursday. Fifteen games would have therefore been classified as Tier 1. A Tier 3 
game (average price of $15.50) would have included all games played on Saturday, 
opening day, the July 4 game, the final home stand of the season, and games played 
after May 14 against the Los Angeles Dodgers, a former division rival. Twenty-two 
games would have fallen into this tier. The remaining 44 games would have been 
classified as Tier 2, with an average ticket price of $13.06, which was the average 
ticket price for the 1996 season.
The hypothesis that the few teams administering VTP are doing so properly 
is consistent with the findings. In fact, the present analysis shows that optimal 
VTP is managed by small changes in ticket prices. The Giants expected to gain 
an additional $1 million from VTP in 2002 (Isidore, 2002; Rovell, 2002b). The 
Giants VTP strategy in 2002 affected only 39 of their 81 home games (all weekend 
dates). The present analysis shows a gain of about $1 million for the 1996 season 
if optimal pricing were used by the Giants.
In 2002, the Atlanta Braves instituted a VTP strategy for 21 home games—Fri-
days in May through August and Saturdays throughout the whole season. During 
these games ticket prices were increased by $3, or about 14%. Testing the same 
policy for the 1996 data, the Atlanta Braves would have 22 home games with VTP 
using a 9% increase in price. It is interesting that the Braves’ actual policy is more 
aggressive than the data show for 1996. The St. Louis Cardinals raised prices in 
2002 for summer games by $2, or 8%. The 1996 data show that an optimal VTP 
strategy would raise prices by about 9%.
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Directions for Future Research
There are many areas of inquiry for the future. An analysis of more recent data that 
include teams using VTP is warranted. The practical application of VTP requires 
one to be able to accurately forecast the relative attendance of future games. In 
other words, in order to know which games should have higher prices and which 
games should have lower prices, team management needs to know whether there is 
consistency from one season to the next in terms of relative attendance. An interest-
ing behavioral issue is whether the implementation of VTP in earlier games affects 
the demand for subsequent games.
One factor unaccounted for in this study is the marketing strategies used by 
organizations in conjunction with VTP price levels. The projected revenue increases 
identified in this study could potentially be increased substantially by incorporating 
VTP pricing into teams’ marketing plans. Although many MLB teams assign each 
game or product into VTP levels based on game or product characteristics, little 
research has investigated how those games of varying characteristics are marketed 
to different demographic segments of consumers.
In addition, research investigating education and public-relations activities 
related to VTP should be conducted. Although fans might initially perceive variable 
pricing as a gauging mechanism, for some fans VTP might allow some expensive 
games to now become more affordable. Methods to assuage consumer fears and 
to attract new consumers should be researched. In addition, implementation costs 
of VTP programs such as menu costs and staff training should be examined and 
accounted for in future economic examinations of VTP.
Finally, future research should investigate the practical application and public 
reaction to future variable-pricing systems using technology to change prices by 
the day, hour, or even minute. Few teams have implemented VTP at this point, 
believing that widespread use of ticket pricing based completely on supply and 
demand would not be met with agreement by some consumers (Cameron, 2002). 
In particular, research should be conducted to identify methods of protecting or 
enhancing value to season-ticket purchasers when a minute-by-minute VTP policy 
is implemented. 
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Appendix
In order to calculate the new price and quantity in which revenue is maximized 
( η = −1 ) when the demand curve shifts, refer to Figure 1 at Point A and let 
	 QA	= 35,793, PA = $13.06, and set ηA A A A AP Q Q P= × = −( ) ( )∆ ∆ 1 .	
At Point C, let 
	 QC = (QA + QB)/2 = (35,793 + 48,961)/2 = 42,377,    
 P Q P QC A C A A= × × − = − × × − =η ( ) , ( $ . , )1 42 377 13 06 35 793 $ .15 46 .
The results for the new price and quantity rely on two attributes of linear 
demand functions. First, the optimal quantity (QC) is simply the average of the 
old quantity (QA) and the new actual quantity (QB). Second, the new optimal price 
uses the elasticity formula, ηC C C A AP Q Q P= × = −( ) ( )∆ ∆ 1 , and solves for PA. 
A key substitute is to note that (∆QA/∆PA) = –PA/QA, because the inverse of the 
slope is constant for the old demand and new demand. Also, PA and QA are given, 
and ηA is set equal to –1. This can be seen in the previous elasticity formula, 
ηA A A A AP Q Q P= × = −( ) ( )∆ ∆ 1 .

